

The Edgar Wind Journal



Volume 5

5/2023

ISSN 2785-2903

www.edgarwindjournal.eu

The Edgar Wind Journal

ISSN 2785-2903

Editors-in-Chief

Bernardino Branca (University of Kent, UK) and Fabio Tononi (NOVA University of Lisbon)

Editorial Board

Jaynie Anderson (University of Melbourne) – Andrew Benjamin (University of Technology, Sydney; Monash University, Melbourne) – Guido Boffi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan) – Peter Burke (University of Cambridge) – Pia Carolla (Università di Genova) – Monica Centanni (Università Iuav di Venezia) – Gioachino Chiarini (Università degli Studi di Siena) – Claudia Cieri Via (Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”) – Stephen Clucas (Birkbeck, University of London) – Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann (Princeton University) – Georges Didi-Huberman (École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris) – Roberto Diodato (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan) – Raphael Ebgi (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan) – Astrid Erll (Goethe University Frankfurt) – Claire Farago (University of Colorado Boulder) – David Freedberg (Columbia University in the City of New York) – Robert Gaston (University of Melbourne) – Maurizio Ghelardi (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa; Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan) – Pascal Griener (University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland) – Martin Kemp (University of Oxford) – Martina Mazzotta (Curator and Independent Scholar) – W. J. T. Mitchell (University of Chicago) – C. Oliver O’Donnell (Bilderfahrzeuge Project, The Warburg Institute) – Arturo Carlo Ottaviano Quintavalle (Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei) – Giulia Maria Paoletti (University of Oxford) – Spyros Papapetros (Princeton University) – Robert Pawlik (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw) – Donald Preziosi (University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)) – Silvia Ronchey (Università degli Studi Roma Tre) – Pablo Schneider (University of Trier) – Elizabeth Sears (University of Michigan) – Salvatore Settis (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa) – Carlo Severi (École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris) – Daniel Sherer (Princeton University School of Architecture) – Larry A. Silver (University of Pennsylvania) – Michael P. Steinberg (Brown University, Providence) – Ianick Takaes de Oliveira (Columbia University in the City of New York) – Ben Thomas (University of Kent, UK) – Stéphane Toussaint (Centre André Chastel, CNRS-Sorbonne Université, Paris) – Claudia Wedepohl (The Warburg Institute) – Sigrid Weigel (Leibniz-Zentrum für Literatur und Kulturforschung (ZfL), Berlin; Technical University of Berlin) – Christopher Wood (New York University) – Valentina Zaffino (Pontificia Università Lateranense, Stato Città del Vaticano, Rome)

Assistant Editor

Giulia Maria Paoletti

Contacts

info@edgarwindjournal.eu
submissions@edgarwindjournal.eu

The Edgar Wind Journal is a biannual, peer-reviewed and international journal, in open access format.

Authors are invited to follow the instructions on the website:

<https://www.edgarwindjournal.eu/submission/>

Publisher

Bernardino Branca

Contact: Corso Magenta 48, 20123, Milan, Italy

Phone: 0039 3483605940

Email: publisher@edgarwindjournal.eu

Table of Contents

Bernardino Branca

Introduction

pp. 1-2

Konstantinos Gravanis

An Intellectual Journey through the Four Elements in Raphael's Stanza della Segnatura

pp. 3-38

Larry Silver

Benjamin West: Modern/History and Religion

pp. 39-59

Robert Pawlik

Note on Pierre Hadot as a Reader of Edgar Wind's *Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance*

pp. 60-70

Jonathan Blower

An Introductory Note to Edgar Wind's *Grundbegriffe*

pp. 71-104

An Introductory Note to Edgar Wind's *Grundbegriffe*

Jonathan Blower

Abstract

This contribution introduces, reproduces and translates Edgar Wind's *Grundbegriffe der Geschichts- und Kulturphilosophie* (*Basic Concepts in the Philosophy of History and Culture*), the last lecture course Wind was able to deliver at the University of Hamburg before his permission to teach was revoked by the National Socialists in 1933. The lecture notes themselves are sketchy, terse and often ambiguous. They cover a wide intellectual terrain, establishing links between the humanities and the natural sciences, rejecting the certainties of classical causality and the 'linear conception of time' in favour of chance, uncertainty and the 'configural conception of time' – modern ideas first fully elaborated in Wind's 1929 *Habilitation* thesis, a critique of Kant that was later published as *Das Experiment und die Metaphysik* (*Experiment and Metaphysics*). The introductory note to the translation sets the lectures in their historical context and identifies Aby Warburg as a decisive influence on the young Wind's thinking. It also discusses certain issues of interpretation arising from the text of the lecture course, which is preserved in two different versions, neither of which was produced by Wind himself.

Keywords

Edgar Wind; *Grundbegriffe*; Hamburg; lectures; translation

In September 1932 Edgar Wind was seeing out the summer in the far north-east of Germany, recovering from a bout of tonsillitis and preparing for the start of the impending academic year. Besides his regular duties at the Warburg Library he was scheduled to deliver three lecture courses at the University of Hamburg, two over the winter and one in the summer.¹ Despite illness and workload he seems to have been in good cheer. A postcard from a colleague in Florence had lifted his spirits, and he was optimistic about the future. Just a few days earlier the Reichstag had been dissolved and new elections called for November 1932. There was an outside chance that the National

¹ Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, MS Wind 2, folder 3, contains cuttings and annotated copies of published lecture lists for the University of Hamburg for 1930–33. Wind's three lecture courses advertised for the academic year 1932–33 were 'Grundbegriffe der Kultur- und Geschichtsphilosophie' (winter semester); 'Englische Kunst und Kunstanschauung im 18. Jahrhundert' (winter semester); and 'Die moderne Skepsis in ihrer geschichtliche Entwicklung' (summer semester).

Socialists might lose their majority. ‘I’m delighted about the political developments,’ he replied to Gertrud Bing, the colleague in Florence, ‘Now we shall finally have some peace.’²

As we know, the lectures Wind delivered in the winter semester of 1932–33 would be his last at the University of Hamburg.³ Along with several other Jewish academics he was dismissed from his post on the basis of racist legislation enacted by the Nazis in April 1933.⁴ This alone is reason enough to publish the lecture notes of Wind’s *Grundbegriffe der Geschichts- und Kulturphilosophie*, a course of twenty-eight lectures which ran from 4 November 1932 to 28 February 1933 and thus coincided with the demise of the Weimar Republic: the federal elections on Sunday 6 November 1932 came two days after Wind’s first lecture (the Nazis won a diminished majority); Hitler was appointed chancellor four weeks before the end of the lecture course; and the Reichstag was set alight in the night before Wind’s final lecture.⁵ One would expect these events to have left some trace in the writings of the young academic.

More positive reasons for publishing these lecture notes – which are not without their problems of interpretation – will be self-evident to those who were fortunate enough to have seen and heard Wind in action at the lectern. He was by all accounts an outstanding public speaker, and these are the only lecture notes to have survived from his Hamburg years. One former student remembers him as ‘a magician of the spoken word.’⁶ Another recalls ‘brilliant lectures [...] delivered without notes, but not memorized beforehand, and spoken with the highest degree of fluency and coherence.’⁷ At the height of Wind’s post-war popularity, we are told, his over-subscribed lecture courses at Oxford spilled out of the university lecture halls and had to be relocated to larger, public theatres.⁸

Wind’s talent for public speaking seems to have been apparent at an early stage in his career. On 13 July 1931, Erwin Panofsky, in a letter to Ernst Cassirer, professor of philosophy at the University of Hamburg, wrote a glowing account of a lecture their young colleague had delivered at the Warburg Library two days prior. ‘It really was a great success, with an exceptionally numerous audience and absolutely resounding applause, even if the

² Warburg Institute Archive, General Correspondence, Edgar Wind to Gertrud Bing, 16 September 1932: ‘Über die politische Entwicklung bin ich entzückt. Jetzt werden wir endlich Ruhe haben.’

³ A note in the margin next to the listing for Wind’s summer lecture course reads ‘NB lectures for this semester presumably not delivered’. Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, MS Wind 2, folder 3.

⁴ Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, MS Wind 2, folder 2, contains copies of correspondence relating to Wind’s dismissal. His permission to teach was withdrawn by the state education authority on 31 July 1933.

⁵ The significance of this parallel has been pointed out by Sascha Freyberg, ‘The Logic of Time: Edgar Wind’s Basic Concepts’, paper presented at the conference *Edgar Wind: Art and Embodiment*, London, 28–29 October 2021.

⁶ Elizabeth Sears, ‘The Life and Work of William S. Heckscher: Some Petites Perceptions’, *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte*, 53 (1990), 107. Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, MS Wind 2, folder 3, contains an offprint of this article.

⁷ Hugh Lloyd-Jones, ‘A Biographical Memoir’ in Edgar Wind, *The Eloquence of Symbols: Studies in Humanist Art*, ed. by Jaynie Anderson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), xxviii. Lloyd-Jones also notes that ‘it was his normal practice to write his lectures only after he had delivered them.’

⁸ Ben Thomas, ‘Edgar Wind: A Short Biography’, *Stan Rzeczny* 1.8 (2015), 127.

percentage of Aryans was too low. [...] Apologies for wittering on about it, but I really did find it very interesting.⁹ This public lecture, which was the last to be held at the Warburg Library before its migration to London, was Wind's 'Humanitätsidee und heroisiertes Porträt in der englischen Kultur des 18. Jahrhunderts'.¹⁰ It likely provided much of the material for the other lecture course Wind gave at the University of Hamburg in the winter semester of 1932–33, on *Englische Kunst und Kunstanschauung im 18. Jahrhundert* (*Art and the view of art in eighteenth-century England*).¹¹

In much the same way, Wind's *Grundbegriffe der Geschichts- und Kulturphilosophie* drew on research that was started or already complete before the winter semester of 1932–33: primarily his *Habilitation*, which was finished in 1929 and published as *Das Experiment und die Metaphysik* in 1934;¹² his paper on 'Warburgs Begriff der Kulturwissenschaft', presented at the Congress of Aesthetics in 1930;¹³ his study of Plato's philosophy of art, from 1932;¹⁴ and his contribution to the first volume of the *Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliographie zum Nachleben der Antike*, which also appeared in 1934.¹⁵ Those who are more familiar with

⁹ Photocopy of a letter from Erwin Panofsky to Ernst Cassirer, 13 July 1931, Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, MS Wind 2, folder 3: 'Es war ein ganz großer Erfolg, mit ungewöhnlich vielem, wenn auch nur zu geringen Prozentsätzen arischem Publikum, und geradezu brausendem Beifall' – 'Verzeihen Sie, wenn ich etwas ins Schwatzen gekommen bin, aber die Sache hat mich wirklich sehr interessiert'.

¹⁰ It was published in the final volume of the *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* (1932), 156–229. For an English translation see Edgar Wind, *Hume and the Heroic Portrait: Studies in Eighteenth-Century Imagery*, ed. by Jaynie Anderson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). According to a letter from Mary Warburg to Frede Warburg, 10 July 1931, WIA GC/34930, Wind's lecture was the last at the Warburg Library before financial constraints put an end to the lecture programme.

¹¹ Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, MS Wind 2, folder 3. See the University of Hamburg lecture list.

¹² Edgar Wind, *Das Experiment und die Metaphysik: Zur Auflösung der kosmologischen Antinomien*, vol. 3 in the series Beiträge zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1934). For an English translation see idem, *Experiment and Metaphysics: Towards a Resolution of the Cosmological Antinomies*, trans. Cyril Edwards with an introduction by Matthew Rampley (Oxford: Legenda, 2001).

¹³ Edgar Wind, 'Warburgs Begriff der Kulturwissenschaft und seine Bedeutung für die Ästhetik', in *Vierter Kongress für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, 25 (1931), 163–79. For an English translation see Edgar Wind, 'Warburg's Concept of *Kulturwissenschaft* and its Meaning for Aesthetics' in idem, *The Eloquence of Symbols: Studies in Humanist Art*, ed. by Jaynie Anderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 21–35.

¹⁴ Edgar Wind, 'Theios Phobos: Untersuchungen über die Platonische Kunstphilosophie', *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, 26 (1932), 349–73. Many of these sources were identified last year by the editor of this journal; see Bernardino Branca, 'Edgar Wind in Hamburg, 1930–33,' *Edgar Wind Journal* 4.1 (2023), 32–64, esp. 45, where he refers to the *Grundbegriffe* as a tentative first draft of a "summa" [...] of the theoretical works Wind produced during the first half of the thirties.

¹⁵ Hans Meier, Richard Newald and Edgar Wind (eds), *Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliographie zum Nachleben der Antike, Erster Band. Die Erscheinungen des Jahres 1931* (Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner and Bibliothek Warburg, 1934). Wind translated his own introduction to this volume for the English edition: *A Bibliography on the Survival of the Classics, First Volume, The Publications of 1931* (London: Cassel & Co. and The Warburg Institute, 1934), on which see the insightful contribution by Giovanni Targia, 'Edgar Wind's Self-Translations: Philosophical Genealogies and Political Implications of a Cultural-Theoretical Tradition' in *Migrating Histories of Art: Self-Translations of a Discipline*, ed. by Maria Teresa Costa and Hans Christian Hönes (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 77–90.

Wind's work will likely find echoes of other research in the lecture notes.¹⁶ Suffice to say here, the two main streams of thought that flowed into the *Grundbegriffe* came from Wind's own philosophical studies and from the powerful influence of Aby Warburg.

The latter is evident throughout Wind's lecture notes: in certain concepts and turns of phrase, in the various authors Wind cites and the wide range of disciplines they represent. One of Warburg's own publications is mentioned – his essay on Francesco Sasseti – and there is a telling constellation of sources that would otherwise seem out of place in a series of lectures on history and culture: the names of Charles Darwin, Ewald Hering and Tito Vignoli. All three were major influences on the young Warburg.

The title of Wind's lecture course also owes a debt to Warburg. Although the more obvious source for the word *Grundbegriffe* would be Heinrich Wölfflin's *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe* of 1915, which Wind quotes (disapprovingly) in the lecture notes (p. 36), the term was still current and circulating in the rarefied air of the Warburg Library when Wind was employed there, from 1928.¹⁷ In 1927 Warburg had corresponded with and met the philosopher Erich Rothacker to discuss his proposed publication of a *Handbuch der kulturphilosophischen Grundbegriffe* (basic concepts in the philosophy of culture),¹⁸ and in 1929 he kept two notebooks under the title *Grundbegriffe I* and *II*.¹⁹ It is unlikely that Wind was unaware of this preoccupation on the part of his employer and mentor.

Before returning briefly to discuss some of the challenges of translating Wind's *Grundbegriffe*, this is perhaps an opportune moment to mention a minor but telling error in the transmission of their title, a piece of pedantry worth bothering with only because it concerns a misinterpretation that potentially has many siblings in the surviving versions of the text.

In the past, the lectures have generally been referred to as the *Grundbegriffe der Geschichte und Kulturphilosophie*, which translates as 'Basic Concepts of History and the Philosophy of Culture'.²⁰ But this oddly asymmetrical title comes from a second- or third-hand source. It is from a transcript of the lecture notes that was made in 1986 by Christa

¹⁶ Many of the themes from the *Grundbegriffe* are taken up in Edgar Wind, 'Some Points of Contact between History and the Natural Sciences' in *Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer*, ed. by Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), 255–64.

¹⁷ The quoted phrase 'Kunstgeschichte ohne Namen' ('art history without names') appears in the preface to the first edition; see Heinrich Wölfflin, *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Das Problem der Stilentwicklung in der neueren Kunst* (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1915), v. For an English translation see idem, *Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Early Modern Art*, ed. by Evonne Levy and Tristan Weddigen, trans. Jonathan Blower (Santa Monica: Getty Research Institute, 2015), 72.

¹⁸ Erwin Panofsky to Aby Warburg, 17 June 1927, WIA GC/19085 and Erich Rothacker to Aby Warburg, 25 June, WIA GC/19228. Rothacker is mentioned on p. 37 of Wind's *Grundbegriffe*.

¹⁹ The notebooks are cited in Ernst Gombrich, *Aby Warburg: An Intellectual Biography* (London: The Warburg Institute, 1970), 347, and preserved at the Warburg Institute Archive in London.

²⁰ See for instance Lloyd-Jones, 'A Biographical Memoir', xvii; Freyberg, 'The Logic of Time'; and Branca, 'Edgar Wind in Hamburg', 32.

and Bernhard Buschendorf, family friends of the Winds, and is now filed with the Edgar Wind Papers in Oxford under MS Wind 2. As Christa Buschendorf explained in her covering letter to Margaret Wind (who may have been considering posthumous publication of the lectures):

Back in Heidelberg we read through the lecture notes 'Basic Concepts of History and the Philosophy of Culture' together and were able to decipher nearly all the abbreviations. Since I saw that the individual pages weren't very densely written, I didn't think it necessary to commission a secretary to type it up. Instead I just went ahead and typed the lectures up myself. It really wasn't any trouble at all. Bernhard is awfully pleased with how much better the text reads now. For there are so many clever thoughts contained in the dense line of argumentation, and discovering them is now far easier than it was before.

To give the text a more familiar appearance I have replaced 'ss' with 'ß' and written out the umlauts as such. In addition, I have silently corrected the spelling in unambiguous cases. There are of course several passages for which the solution had to be interpreted, and there were yet other passages – and these are indicated – where we were unable to choose between different solutions. I'm sending you the manuscript separately, as printed matter.²¹

The important information to take from this cutting – which is literally taped to the title page of the Buschendorf typescript – is that the Buschendorfs' rendering of Wind's *Grundbegriffe* is an expanded version of some earlier, abbreviated document. The title page of the transcript confirms this: a typed note hidden beneath the two paragraphs quoted above reads 're-typed by Christa Buschendorf from original typescript in which many words were abbreviated'.²² As luck would have it, this heavily abbreviated 'original typescript' – the version reproduced below – has also survived with the Edgar Wind

²¹ Letter from Christa Buschendorf to Margaret Wind, 3 August 1986. Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, MS Wind 2, folder 3: '...zurück in Heidelberg, haben wir uns das Vorlesungsskript "Grundbegriffe der Geschichte und Kulturphilosophie" gemeinsam durchgelesen und die Abkürzungen fast alle aufschlüsseln können. Da ich sah, daß die einzelnen Seiten nicht sehr dicht beschrieben waren, hielt ich es nicht für nötig, eigens eine Sekretärin mit dem Abtippen zu beauftragen, sondern habe die Vorlesung kurzerhand selbst getippt. Es war wirklich keine große Sache! Bernhard ist ganz begeistert davon, wieviel besser der Text sich nunmehr lesen läßt. Es stecken ja auch so viele kluge Gedanken in dem dichten Argumentationsgang, und die kann man nun viel müheloser entdecken als zuvor. | Ich habe, um das Schriftbild noch vertrauter zu machen, "ss" in "ß" verwandelt und die Umlaute als solche geschrieben. Außerdem habe ich in eindeutigen Fällen stillschweigend die Rechtschreibung verbessert. Es gibt natürlich etliche Stellen, an denen man nur über eine Interpretation zu einer Lösung kommt, und es gibt weiterhin Stellen – und diese sind markiert –, wo wir uns zwischen unterschiedlichen Lösungen nicht entscheiden konnten. Das Manuskript geht Ihnen gesondert als Drucksache zu.' In the same archival folder, a copy of this passage is affixed to the title page of the transcript it mentions: Edgar Wind, 'Grundbegriffe der Geschichte und Kulturphilosophie: An outline of his last course of lectures as Privatdozent in Hamburg, 4 XI 1932 – 24 II 1933', transcription by Christa and Bernhard Buschendorf.

²² Wind, *Grundbegriffe*, Buschendorf transcript, title page. Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, MS Wind 2, folder 3.

Papers, under MS Wind 154. It bears the laconic title: ‘Wind: Grundbegriffe d.Gesch.u.Kulturphilos.’²³

So the Buschendorfs’ typescript of 1986 is an expanded transcript of this earlier, abbreviated document, and the title of their document is an expanded version of the heavily abbreviated original title, which can and should be read differently: not as ‘Grundbegriffe der Geschichte und Kulturphilosophie’ (basic concepts of history and cultural philosophy), but as ‘Grundbegriffe der Geschichts- und Kulturphilosophie’ (basic concepts in the philosophy of history and culture). A fine distinction, and largely inconsequential, but helpful insofar as it alerts the reader to the fact that the Buschendorf transcript is an interpretation of Wind’s lecture notes and therefore – like the translation that follows here – subject to human error. Further confirmation of this misreading can be found on the first page of the Buschendorf transcript, where Margaret Wind has added a handwritten reference to the University of Hamburg lecture list (presumably unseen by the Buschendorfs): ‘Lecture course no. 306 (Winter semester 1932–3) announced in lecture list as: Grundbegriffe der Kultur- und Geschichtsphilosophie.’²⁴ History and culture have changed places in the transition from lecture notes to lecture list, but the grammatical form – with the hanging hyphen – is identical to the interpretation of the title being put forward here.

Another glitch in the Buschendorf transcript can be attributed to its means of reproduction. In a passage towards the end of the lecture for 15 November 1932 (p. 6), the Buschendorfs were bemused by the unfamiliar fragment ‘volut.’ and rightly flagged it with a bracketed question mark. The same passage in the earlier typescript, from MS Wind 154, has ‘Evolut.’ for ‘evolution’. The explanation for the missing initial becomes obvious when comparing the original typescript to one of the two photocopies of it contained in the same archival folder: the capital ‘E’ in the original was typed too softly to be detected and reproduced by the copier that generated the photocopy from the which the Buschendorfs produced their copy.²⁵

As if these multiple layers of reproductive and interpretive fallibility – photocopied typescript, Buschendorf transcript, translation by myself – were not enough to complicate any unambiguous comprehension of an already difficult document, there may well have been yet another interpreter involved. What Margaret Wind called the ‘original typescript’ was probably not made by Edgar Wind at all. Certain features of the typescript in MS Wind 154 suggest that this version was produced by yet another pair of hands, perhaps a member of the secretarial staff at the Warburg Library, possibly even Wind’s first wife,

²³ Edgar Wind, ‘Wind: Grundbegriffe d.Gesch.u.Kulturphilos.’ anonymous transcription, title page. Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, MS Wind 154, folder 3.

²⁴ Wind, ‘Grundbegriffe’, Buschendorf transcript. Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, MS Wind 2, folder 3.

²⁵ Ibid. Elsewhere, ‘Biologie’ (biologist) is rendered as ‘Biologie’ (biology) and the misspelt ‘Haysenberg’ is retained while ‘Hernig’ is silently corrected.

Ruth.²⁶ Edgar Wind was certainly not immune to typographical errors such as ‘Heysenberg’ (Heisenberg, p. 3), ‘C. Riegl’ (A. Riegl, p. 14) and ‘Hernig’ (Hering, p. 14), but the originality of the ‘original typescript’ is called into question by the numerous lacunae that have been left in the text and, among other imperfections, a couple of suspect phrases involving Hegel (the name most frequently invoked in the *Grundbegriffe*, closely followed by Dilthey).

The first of these Hegelian errors is the name ‘Karditz’, which appears entirely out of the blue where one would expect to find the word ‘Kritik’ (of Hegel, p. 20) – a plausible alternative put forward by the Buschendorfs.²⁷ This apparent mistranscription is strongly suggestive of the legibility issues that are so often associated with handwritten sources. The other Hegel-related lapse, which occurs on the same page of the typescript, is a simple dropped negation, bane of every scribe and translator. Here the anonymous amanuensis has typed: ‘Für H. kann das Subjekt der Geschichte ein empirischer Gegenstand sein. Das Subjekt kann nur das Ganze sein.’ (In English: ‘For H. the subject of history can be an empirical object. The subject can only be the whole.’) The second of these two sentences clearly contradicts the first, and the first contradicts everything we know about Hegel. The solution seems simple: ‘ein’ in the first sentence should instead read ‘kein’ (and ‘can’ becomes ‘cannot’). The Hegelian subject of history – spirit, surely – cannot possibly be an empirical object. Would Wind have made this mistake? Perhaps, but it seems more likely that the first typescript version of the *Grundbegriffe* was typed by someone else.

This level of attention to textual detail, glitches in transcripts and errors of transmission will perhaps seem excessive and gratuitous, but it makes an important point: the two source texts on which the following translation of Wind’s *Grundbegriffe* is based – the Buschendorf transcript of 1986 and the anonymous ‘original typescript’ reproduced here – are fallible and flawed in ways that often amount to little more than the presence or absence of a single character or punctuation mark: the missing ‘E’ of ‘Evolution’, the dropped ‘k’ from ‘kein’, the implicit hanging hyphen in the heavily contracted title.

That said, these reliability issues with the source texts are more than compensated for by the impressive interpretive labour that was done by Christa and Bernhard Buschendorf some forty years ago. Their expanded transcript helpfully reveals the full sense of contracted words that might otherwise have remained obscure to someone whose first language is not German. In any case, readers of Wind’s *Grundbegriffe* have greater obstacles to overcome, for the very form and content of the lecture notes often confound comprehension.

²⁶ Ruth Wind (née Hatch), an American, acquired German quickly and will almost certainly have been able to decipher her husband’s hand by 1933. In November 1928 she was ‘seriously learning German’ and by March 1929 she was already translating Warburg’s *Heidnisch-antike Weissagung in Wort und Bild zu Luthers Zeiten*. See Edgar and Ruth Wind to Aby Warburg, 17 November 1928, WIA GC/22057; Edgar Wind to Aby Warburg, 13 March 1929, WIA GC/22041; and Targia, ‘Edgar Wind’s Self-Translations’, 81.

²⁷ For his opinion on this and various other quirks of the Buschendorf transcript I am grateful to Wolfgang Brückle.

Firstly, it should be borne in mind that they were written as mere aides-memoire by an author with a prodigious memory who held the vast majority of the material in his head. Each of the twenty-eight lectures was scheduled to run for an hour (Tuesdays and Fridays from eleven until noon), and yet each was condensed onto little more than a single sheet of typed notes. The result is a telegraphic style that curtails and often omits words completely, relying on memory and tacit understanding to complete or reinstate them as required. Of course, this poses a challenge to any reader or translator, since so much of the context that would usually help with the process of teasing out implied meaning is simply not present. For this reason, the translation below relies heavily on the Buschendorf transcript of Wind's lecture notes, amending their interpretations where they seemed to misrepresent the earlier transcript and giving best guesses where Wind's intentions remained unclear. While dispensing with the abbreviations, the translation generally reproduces the concise form of the source text. For the most part it also mirrors the liberal and seemingly indiscriminate use of dashes, parentheses and other punctuation marks.

Secondly, the varied content of the *Grundbegriffe* presents a significant challenge to those unfamiliar with Wind's broad intellectual terrain, though it also offers them several olive branches. Wind names over seventy authors in the course his lectures, and by no means all of them are philosophers and historians; nearly as many are social or natural scientists. To fully understand Wind's notes, then, the ideal reader would need to have a decent grasp of modern physics, chemistry, biology, physiology and psychology, not to mention philosophy, history, economics, sociology and art history. Thankfully, Wind often cites specific works by the authors he intends to discuss, so some of the required knowledge can be acquired. This knowledge of Wind's sources proved invaluable when preparing the translation. Not all sources were consulted, but some were indispensable – not least Wind's own works. First among these is *Das Experiment und die Metaphysik*, where the concepts of linear and configural time, so central to the *Grundbegriffe*, are illustrated and explained far more eloquently than they could be here.²⁸ The one corresponds to an historical world of law, causality, determinism and inevitability, whereas the other, in which the future is unknown, permits of chance, spontaneity, freedom and individual action.

Where Wind mentions an author only by surname, the translation does the same; where he gives the title of a work relatively accurately, I have either translated that title or, as with the essay on Francesco Sasseti, given the title of the pre-existing English translation. Where a source is given only imprecisely, as with the reference to the second of Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations*, the translation follows suit. For ease of comparison the translation gives page numbers from the source text(s) in square brackets. Brackets are also used to indicate new interpolations, as with the dropped negation in the abovementioned sentence about Hegel. Emphases in the form of underlinings and increased spacings are retained along with all lacunae. Some of the ambiguities noted in the Buschendorf transcript have been translated and carried over as footnotes. Many of the ambiguities in

²⁸ Wind, *Das Experiment und die Metaphysik*, 83–115; Wind, *Experiment and Metaphysics*, 93–125.

the source text(s) are passed over in silence, others are approximated or reproduced, some will have been missed altogether.

Bibliography

- Branca, Bernardino, 'Edgar Wind in Hamburg, 1930–33,' *Edgar Wind Journal* 4 (2023), 32–64.
- Freyberg, Sascha, 'The Logic of Time: Edgar Wind's Basic Concepts', paper presented at the conference *Edgar Wind: Art and Embodiment*, London, 28–29 October 2021.
- Gombrich, Ernst, *Aby Warburg: An Intellectual Biography* (London: The Warburg Institute, 1970).
- Lloyd-Jones, Hugh, 'A Biographical Memoir' in Edgar Wind, *The Eloquence of Symbols: Studies in Humanist Art*, ed. by Jaynie Anderson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
- Meier, Hans, Newald, Richard and Wind, Edgar (eds), *A Bibliography on the Survival of the Classics, First Volume, The Publications of 1931* (London: Cassel & Co. and The Warburg Institute, 1934).
- Meier, Hans, Newald, Richard and Wind, Edgar (eds), *Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliographie zum Nachleben der Antike, Erster Band. Die Erscheinungen des Jahres 1931* (Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner and Bibliothek Warburg, 1934).
- Sears, Elizabeth, 'The Life and Work of William S. Heckscher: Some Petites Perceptions', *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte*, 53 (1990).
- Targia, Giovanni, 'Edgar Wind's Self-Translations: Philosophical Genealogies and Political Implications of a Cultural-Theoretical Tradition' in *Migrating Histories of Art: Self-Translations of a Discipline*, ed. by Maria Teresa Costa and Hans Christian Hönes (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 77–90.
- Thomas, Ben, 'Edgar Wind: A Short Biography', *Stan Rzecz* 1.8 (2015).
- Wind, Edgar, *Experiment and Metaphysics: Towards a Resolution of the Cosmological Antinomies*, trans. Cyril Edwards with an introduction by Matthew Rampley (Oxford: Legenda, 2001).
- , *Das Experiment und die Metaphysik: Zur Auflösung der kosmologischen Antinomien*, vol. 3 in the series Beiträge zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1934)
- , 'Humanitätsidee und heroisiertes Porträt in der englischen Kultur des 18. Jahrhunderts', *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* (1932), 156–229.

- , *Hume and the Heroic Portrait: Studies in Eighteenth-Century Imagery*, ed. by Jaynie Anderson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
- , ‘Some Points of Contact between History and the Natural Sciences’ in *Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer*, ed. by Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), 255–64.
- , ‘Theios Phobos: Untersuchungen über die Platonische Kunstphilosophie’, *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, 26 (1932), 349–73.
- , ‘Warburg’s Concept of *Kulturwissenschaft* and its Meaning for Aesthetics’ in idem, *The Eloquence of Symbols: Studies in Humanist Art*, ed. by Jaynie Anderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 21–35.
- , ‘Warburgs Begriff der Kulturwissenschaft und seine Bedeutung für die Ästhetik’, *Vierter Kongress für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, 25 (1931), 163–79.
- Wölfflin, Heinrich, *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Das Problem der Stilentwicklung in der neueren Kunst* (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1915).
- , *Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Early Modern Art*, ed. by Evonne Levy and Tristan Weddigen, trans. Jonathan Blower (Santa Monica: Getty Research Institute, 2015).

Basic Concepts in the Philosophy of History and Culture

Edgar Wind

Translated by Jonathan Blower

4 November 1932

Connection between Culture and History

Theory: culture related to history as subject to predicate (false theory): every culture follows historical forms. (Disproof: primitive cultures no historical development). Use of pathology to explain these questions: symbolic maladies, neuroses, cultural maladies. –

Essential to definition of culture (cultural and natural phenomena): concept of the symbol. Whole problem hinges on this concept. Relationship of history with symbols to history without symbols (natural). Various temporal forms need to be defined.

Relationship of historically developing symbols to symbols without history. Interrelationship of cultural stages: problem of time necessary within ancient history. Can different cultural stages be transposed onto one another? This problem not theoretically soluble (see above): Windelband, Rickert.

Windelband: history: interest in the particular, individualising; natural science: interest in the universal, generalising. This opposition already in Carlyle: history – facts. Poincaré: possibility of the recurrence of an event of interest to natural science. The particular (history) of no interest. It is interested in things that are transferable.

Rickert, 'The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science: A Logical Introduction to the Historical Sciences' (student of Windelband).

[2] Stark contrast between history and nature. Highpoint in 'Science and History: A Critique of Positivist Epistemology' = culture = subject of natural science. Intervention transforming cultural phenomena into natural phenomena. – How does this transition happen? Question whether development of culture without meaning in this theory. Demonstrate as logically absurd for history and natural science.

Kant: antinomy – time without beginning. This modern theory accepts time as linear sequence. Antinomy carried over into history. Historical sequence without beginning or end. Problem of emergence of cultural phenomena from natural phenomena glossed over

by linear concept of time. – History rendered absurd by linear concept of time and separation of nature and culture. has to begin with the linear concept of time.

Past Future

8 November 1932

Two quite decisive¹ problems:

1) Problem of causal determination. Are there events that are determined to such an extent that preceding events can be inferred from them?

Problem of the Laplacian spirit. This spirit, from a moment at which it surveys everything, could infer everything that will follow. Connection to the problem of time. Linear temporal sequence: time passes in moments. The cross axis would then contain all contemporaneous events: picture of the present world. How is the point (!) to be determined? If I understand the point as having no extension, then no present exists. (The boundary between past [3] and future is the present). What then does exist? The present moment the only reality. Paradox within the concept of time. At the point of intersection: moment constellation. If the physicist knows the constellation at 0, he can predict that at 0₁ (time 0 – 0₁ can be chosen at random). Only one way of learning about spatially distant points: spatial communication: signals, which again take time! This gives rise to a completely new picture! Future not separated from past by a simple line, but rather

present

future

This double region shows there is still a region that neither admits nor emits effects. Contingent on speed of emitted medium (there is no infinitely fast medium!) –

Consequences of schemata. If such a region (present!) is interposed, one can no longer predict what will happen in the future!

Range of possibilities: the present can never be calculated with precision (Heisenberg?).

Modern physics: if event A occurs, event B or C or D follows from it. Prediction of possible alternatives. (Configural concept of time). In the configural concept of time there is chance. What the physicist calls chance, the historian, psychologically, calls freedom. The whole question of freedom and causality is connected to the concept of time. (Compare Kant's concept of time and his ethics!) Influence of the Kantian concept right up to [4] the

¹ ?

present (action!). Based on a conception of nature long since superceded. Mechanical conception of the unfurling of nature dispatched by configural concept of time. There are certain alternatives from which one can choose. Knowledge – subject to errors – ethical (not logical!) consequences. This is where the problems start for the philosophy of culture and history. Man bound to the laws of nature. His knowledge of the possibility of alternatives supplies the justification for his actions. Beginning and end of time in configural time: depends on the widening and narrowing of the angle!

11 November 1932

The configural concept as borderline case transitioning to the linear. Linear method not serviceable at greatest and smallest dimensions. (Example of electron, Edison: the more precise the location, the less definite the velocity – and vice versa. Predictable leeway between the two). – The means of investigation influence the subjects under investigation. – If the medium of communication (configural conception) becomes so slow that movement stops, that means the end of time: dissolution of world into state of uniformity comprehensible from (linear and) configural concept of time. The configuration itself disappears.

Concept of matter: quantity of matter remains consistent through construction and destruction. Indestructibility! Particle concept (smallest matter) – basic concept of classical [5] physics. Modern physics – particles: extended elements. ‘Wave parcels’ – destructible because waves can be flattened. Hence disappearance of matter – and end of time (see above) – based on linear concept. Then: how do physics and chemistry relate to one another? Physics: particles. Chemistry: elements. No initial connection to physics. But: elements to be understood by physics as configurations of particles. Certain stability in this configuration. Various degrees between levels of configuration (Rutherford) – atoms classed according to degrees of fragility. Decay of atoms to be explained physically (to render former phenomenon comprehensible – connection!) How can pure chance in physics be necessary in chemistry? Likewise relationship of biology and chemistry.

15 November 1932

Theory of parallelism – parallel to sequences in time – others that proceed similarly. Parallel conception of relationship between the physical and the psychical (Carterius). Spinoza – systematic explanation: both series of events proceed side by side, in parallel. A correspondence arises; every sensation relates to the preceding sensation. Leibniz – analogy of two clocks. God understands these clocks, which run identically – but independently of one another. A miracle must be postulated at the beginning of time (act of divine wisdom) in order for the theory of parallelism to work.

[6] Rationalists – divine intervention at every minute to harmonise the two series.

This view, not [only] in the realm of political economy ('Morus') but also in so-called history of spirit (immanent development – parallelism –), ultimately reducible to the linear concept of time: infinite series: a process always explained by its precursor etc. The concept of the 'new' of originality has no place in this conception of the world! Schlegel's postulate: historian = prophet facing backwards – taken entirely seriously here. Always question: when did this particular phenomenon occur?

Configural concept of time. Disappearance of matter (see above) only explicable by configural relationship. –

Phenomenon of emergence C. Lloyd Morgan (biologist). Theory elaborated by S. Alexander: 'Space, Time and Deity'. Morgan: 'Emergent Evolution' (rigorously scientific). Axiom: effect can be greater than cause. (Physicists: cause and effect of equal magnitude). This axiom of emergent evolution long prevalent in German psychology (in England discovered in biology) to explain promotion to other orders.

18 November 1932

Emergence theory implemented in physics. Concept of particle dissolved. – (Whitehead: concept of the organism).

View of the world that investigates the surrounding part of the world in a specific situation. Means of investigation have again become parts of the world being investigated. Parallels: historical documents [7] in historical world, – physical instruments in physical world: question of validity. – Contemporary philosophy (Dilthey): opposite of natural science and historian: natural science approaches the world from without, history from within. Wind: history and natural science stand within the world with their instruments. Problem of beginning.

Configural concept of time gives sense of periodicity – likewise problem of space. Space can only be experienced through means that exist in space. Question: how far is self-extension possible? Thus any question that regards the world from outside is absurd. –

Linear conception of time: ultimately a form of theological consideration from outside. Assumption of a being that has nothing to do with the world. Method of theodicy: particular importance to philosophy of history because old physical methods replaced by new. Unpalatable consequence of this view: God responsible for everything. Individual decisions futile because pre-empted by grand scheme. Why the luxury on God's part of unfurling in time something he implicitly understands. – Hegel: mathematical replaced by

historical proof.² Reaction: Goethe, e.g. insistence on an inevitable sequence of events = end of the idea of God. Mathematical view immediately rejected. Divinity in³ contingency. Periodicity most readily obtained from biological perspective (Goethe). Concepts of emergence and death applied to phenomena of consciousness.

22 November 1932

Proposition on consciousness: whatever is presented is presented by consciousness, hence consciousness cannot be inferred from matter: principle of all idealistic theories. Question [8] differentiations: sleep, dream. –

Logical theory of consciousness: elements of mental life and ideas (Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume) right up to the psychopathology of the modern age: on the concept of the ‘unconscious imagination’ (repression). Gradual collapse of this concept (tied to linear substantiation).

Freud proceeds from theory of association. Three laws: ideas combine 1) when they are adjacent, 2) cause and effect, 3) when they are similar.

(The same laws in Hume). Mental life: process is the association of ideas according to these three laws (concept already ‘complex’).

Freud’s distinction between external perceptions and internal perceptions (which arise in perfect accord with the example of external perceptions) also from the eighteenth century. It is a distinction only between material in the life of the mind. Why distinction of intensity? Eighteenth century: the more ideas become associated with a specific idea, the stronger that idea becomes; intensity of association establishes distinct reality – dream.

Objection: reality of things does not coincide with intensity of ideas. In the modern age: these ideas are simultaneously bound up with emotion; the stronger it is, the stronger the idea (emotions are ‘superficially attached’ (Freud); they disrupt the process of association with dynamism. – Each repression bound up with transposition of emotion (disruptions in mechanism of association). Assertion on the basis of pathological phenomena: association can be disrupted. Impulsive life is [9] externally bound up with ideas, runs parallel, the impulse connects to the same association, as ideas combine with one another.

The old concept of consciousness modified by accounting for the power of impulses (expressed in old terms). Linearity in the process of mental events.

² Or movement

³ Or is

25 November 1932

Theory of recollection or memory: ideas not present to consciousness are nonetheless there: unconscious ideas. Locke: question of impressions and ideas not present to consciousness, what do they do meanwhile? Because the linear conception of time requires that they are always present in time. The same in physics, matter does not disappear. –

Phenomenon of transposition of one idea onto another (Freud: neurosis) – also in normal processes (e.g. transposition of sense of touch to sense of sight). Actual coincidence of the two perceptions allows transfer: association psychology. This theory assumes the senses are separate even in elementary forms (child). But separation of senses only possible at higher levels. Child acts and perceives on the basis of affect. Actions form unity. Separation only with consciousness.

On theory of memory. Question: in complex mental life how can certain elementary experiences effectively act as elementary habitus? (not as process in time). Memory as disposition in the manner of relating to the [10] environment, where complex form can be dismantled (modern psychology). Modern psychology demonstrates the opposite of this Freudian theory. Diffuse perceptions possess higher stimulus intensity.

Increase in complexity thus entails reduction in intensity of excitation. Dissolution of higher level implies in weaker theory of memory: elementary excitation channelled into higher excitation. – Freud: symbol of coincidence. displacement of total energy to situation.

29 November 1932

Motivational theory of history – obverse Hume: ‘History of England’. For each phenomenon motive sought in preceding idea. History presented as sequence of conscious intellectual choices. In modern historiography: choice merely exponent of ‘subterranean driving forces’. Between consciously and impulsively determined mass: conception. – Here too a kind of parallelism as solution: mass movement interpreted as realm of ideas that can be understood. Thus impulsive mass movement projected into conscious realm (historical materialism – the same in psychoanalysis). (Freud: Eros – death drive: two poles, between them: tension).

Problems:

- 1) Differentiation in life of imagination
- 2) Symbolism
- 3) Memory, connected to 1) and 2). –

Husserl: phenomenological psychology: Brentano: representation primary, sensation secondary. Results of experience: the stronger the affect, the less the capacity for differentiation in mental representation. Man: primal being who rushes into state of excitation and reaction but [11] gradually finds a neutral state: retardation. Representation: still greater retardation. All sensations to be defined by state of retardation. Various degrees of distanciation from environment to be distinguished. Temporal pauses in conduct of reactions! (Phenomenon of emergence!) concept of time – leeway. – The higher the detachment the lower the affect. Various degrees of neutrality vis-à-vis environment: observation from animal psychology and psychology of primitives:

Vignoli: 'Myth and Science'. Psychology of animals; excitation response at various depths casts light on the point at which association theory falls down (proposition: burnt child fears fire: false!). Child learns that certain things do not burn, do not cause pain, not vice versa; gradual neutralisation, taming = learning process (animal experiments). – Impulses differentiated by temporal intervals between affect and idea. 'Tension' does not exist for primitive man. Culture suspended between distinct orders (religion, art etc.). Essential element of development: break-through from primitive state. Neurosis: cultural malady, incapacity for freedom due to tension, neurosis – state of basic attachment retained. Dissociation of the idea implies freedom, tension. Reduction of tension by hypnosis. Intoxication (Baudelaire): tracing back to primitive state: emotion – not state of ideation.

- 1) Malady due to incapacity to break through
- 2) Lack of tension in major excitations

Symbol theory based on this.

[12]

2 December 1932

Also psychoanalysis – concept of the symbol: one symbol can stand for the other. – Symbol:

- 1) Ritual type of symbol
- 2) Purely conceptual symbol (sign)

1. Example: serpent ritual (Indian): invocation of rain (serpent – lightning) through dance and taking possession of the serpent. Excitement neutralised among cultivated people, who are therefore incapable of such actions. – Primitive belief: the most dangerous things are the most desirable (this leads to cannibalism; double form of behaviour, simultaneity of antitheses, of tensions; serpent and lightning indistinguishable in this simultaneity).

2. Example from Jewish ritual: (phylacteries – meaning: hand and mind tied to belief. A magical act for the Jews. Later: mere commemorative symbol; sign of psychological process. Question: to what extent are symbols necessary when one has already freed oneself from the magical bond? Customs retained because they recall actions. Hence conceptually trained man still needs signs as reminders (see serpent symbolism). –

3. Christian example: Eucharist (sicut controversy) symbolism in detached form – serving memory. Signal character of symbolism tied to act in which symbol is manipulated. –

At magical, primitive level: symbol merely signal (serpent ritual). No antithetical notion of symbol. At next level: [13] separation of symbol from its significance. Tension in concept of the symbol. Santayana: Communication of the symbol: philosophy built on this.

Two spheres (the given (as real perceptions) and the real. Everyone in suspension, oscillating between these spheres. On reflection man becomes a sceptic.

Symbol only as signal: ritual conception. Apprehension of tension: allegorical conception (see above). Cultural-philosophical problem with shift from ritual to allegorical conception (only then can one really speak of ‘symbols’!)

Relation of sign to thing: Whitehead: ‘Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect’. All symbolic relationships reversible (proven in the example of poetic production and poetic enjoyment). For emergence of symbols – excitation in active sense necessary. – Redemptive function of symbol: (late development of symbol) – antithesis: creating directly from state of agitation (image) and beholding (symbol).

Warburg, astrology. Isolation of the celestial significance of a magical act. Between stimuli – neutral zones. Observation and calculation finally replace the magical element. Signs (see Bär) seem random because primitive stimulus has been lost, adherence to these images preserved only in signs, and it is for that reason alone that heaven is a psychological reality which ... would not exist for calculation alone. – With detachment actual meaning is to a certain extent lost, albeit still demonstrable: problem of historical memory.

[14]

6 December 1932

Hering (biologist): ‘Memory as a function of organised matter’. Repetition of process changes objects involved in that process. Matter preserves traces of past actions. (Example of muscle development, phenomenon of habitus. Problem: how are we to conceive temporally of the mnemonic process? – Analytical process – forms (precepts) with which the individual has to engage. As with the configural concept of time: course of action given leeway here.

Presupposition for differentiation: ambiguity of formula itself. Symbols assumed by tradition are ambiguous. Unequivocally defined object distinct from necessarily ambiguous symbol.

Abstract symbol theory: Symbol can clearly be understood as having a linear historical development. Follows logical laws. Unequivocality of symbols given (Hegel: history evolves through movement of concepts, new phases deduced by antithesis) in absolutely logical development; so too in art history: A. Riegl's 'Law of immanent development'. –

Returning to the moment of the separation of sensory regions. Observation: eighteenth-century dispute between Goethe and Newton (comparative classification of colours (Goethe) versus derivation of all colours from white (Newton)). Colour..... polarity, tension (Goethe) eighteenth century.

Lichtenberg – attempt to synthesise these theories. Unequivocality of colour definition. – Similarities and differences between Goethe and Newton. –

[15] No doing away with the ambiguity of perception. – Are symbols in historical sequence to be defined in such a way that their appearance becomes a matter of indifference? On this rests the problem of polarity – ambiguity and polarity of behaviour in symbolism.

9 December 1932

D. Katz: 'The Appearance of Colours'.

Colours change as colours when their symbolic functions change. Perceived colours versus objective colours. Tension within colours (various emphases).

H. Werner: work on linguistic physiognomics. Emotional emphasis changes presentation of speech. – Within perception – tension between emotional and objective aspects. Hence ambiguity and polarity.

Connection between polarity problem and emergence theory (pause for reflection!) Meaning of symbols: ideational realm of ideas (and from there that every symbol has a meaning). (But: under what conditions do symbols emerge?) Symbols comprehensible or incomprehensible to varying degrees. One characteristic isolated from the whole, from the object. In all cases a logically arbitrary element. Here almost always called allegory. (The obscure, the incomprehensible). Issue of emergence essential to understanding of symbols. (Meaningless from a logical perspective). Each symbol has its own intermediate position and its own double meaning. Signal significance (triggers causal action). Connection to excitation! Connection to magic.

[16] Signals that the primitive calls 'omina'. They govern his mode of behaviour. One acts intuitively, without giving a thought to emergence. The primitive seeks to eliminate the

form of risk (in his actions). The primitive is familiar with the pause for reflection, for he fears that something may emerge (future!). He tries to keep that moment to a minimum. A certain regulation of action. Symbol immediately and almost only as signal. Since the ambiguity of the symbol is also minimised in emotional terms. The opposite when one attempts to grasp the symbol as a concept. For rationalising man, the way I execute a gesture is a matter of indifference so long as its meaning is clear. (Ultimate consequence in mathematics, x and y interchangeable). Ideal of translatability from one system to another. The series of signals in mathematics (+ ... -) have no emotional character. They themselves have become elements of signification. All symbols in civilised life – intermediate level between the primitive and the mathematical.⁴ Even in language, signs are fraught with original emotional character so that any translation is transformation. Conversely, mathematicians just as extreme as magicians. Pause for reflection almost eliminated. No transfer possible in magic. – State of relative transferability. – A certain latitude. Signals pointing towards identity still ambivalent however. Symbol seen through medium of memory. This act of recollection absent with mathematicians and magicians. The behaviour of the magician is sometimes found at the developed level. But there is always the ‘danger’ that one will reflect on what one does.

[17] Two types in cultural behaviour: this crisis regarded as anathema (reflection must be excluded). The other: reflection, doubt as the only human position. (Middle ground possible!) – Connection to the problem of the Renaissance (memory!) Act of abrupt return to its original significance. Psychologically, the problem of the Renaissance is based on the double nature of the symbol. Exposition! – Periodicity of behaviour: clear signals in primitive events. – The logician really ought not to use the concept of time (only typology of behaviour possible, no philosophy of history). The notion of time in this operation transferred to history. (Hegel?) Inevitably linear. An individual’s achievements cannot be psychologically understood in this way. Originality, creation, excluded because history is organised in logical, linear fashion. –

13 December 1932

Magician: symbol = signal character for an action.

Logician: symbol = sign for a meaning.

Important for this polarity is an observation from animal psychology: W. K ö h l e r : Experiments with chickens and apes. The chicken reacts to stimuli quite mechanically. With the ape there is a kind of crisis: it suddenly ‘understands’. Prior agitation and, as a result, greater errors (than with the chicken). Moment of uncertainty, before it has understood. With the ape – action no longer unambiguously defined. Room for thought. Ambivalence

⁴ Or primitives and mathematicians

of expression. Gestures in the [18] response for an incentive. Nuanced gestures ambivalent (at extremes – dismay and excitement. Identical expressive gestures). (See lectures on ‘Aesthetics’).

The same muscles in motion as are active in physical reaction. D a r w i n – symbolic gestures presented as residue of physical motion. This does not explain the function of expression.

Piderit: there is an imaginary ‘object’ (= meaning) at work which produces the expression. Middle way: the symbolic gesture ‘recalls’ the physical state. The more intensive the reaction, the greater the approximation to the physical. Depending on the subtlety of the distancing, the physical reaction can become symbolic. (Compare metaphor in language.) Not transferral, rather the immediate becomes something mediated. Warburg: engaged on the formation of metaphors (work?): understanding metaphors through the particle ‘as’. (Example: ‘You are as a flower’). This transition to ‘as’ accomplished in poetic, magical expression. Taken literally: consistent regression from distancing to immediacy. Ambiguity only becomes unambiguous in borderline cases. From the very fact of symbolism it follows that time must be configural. If all historical development is tied to symbolic forms, our own adaptation is always also contestation. This phenomenon of polarisation (figure – not to be taken literally) intervenes in the process of transmission. Tradition also contestation. Oscillation back and forth between image and sign.

Rhythm of historical development. (Generation of sons [19] closer to that of their grandfathers etc.). Not unambiguously regressive; things just fused together are split apart again etc. The polarity of symbols gives rise to a certain periodicity. Periodicity: temporal expression of this polarity. Equilibrium always established at regular intervals. Renaissance: comprehensible by this theory of the symbol. Regressions in history: not a singular but a regular process. Triggered by documents, art etc. (Laocoön – Renaissance. Renewal of pagan antiquity, amalgamation with Christendom. Pathos of antiquity has become essential but also distanced and nuanced. Renaissance precisely there where it adopted the ‘Dionysian’, very distanced form. (Compare Warburg, ‘Francesco Sassetti’s Last Injunctions to His Sons’, 1907) Ghirlandaio: stimuli that were foremost in antiquity appear in grisaille, allegorically – the ‘as’ right away. Christian symbols elsewhere in the image than in pagan antiquity. Particular tension and proportions. Various spiritual locations. In Spencer’s philosophy: compatibility). Entirely contradictory impulses etc. necessary for life. Primitives given compatibility immediately. For civilised man: tension. In the Renaissance: the antique may be transformed into the Christian. Reynolds: Greek maenad appears as mourning Magdalene. Highest ecstasies of pleasure become highest ecstasies of pain. Maximum excitation preserved. Maenads particularly ambiguous. Switch from the saintly to the horrific etc. because the very symbol is symbolised in the act of appropriation.

Hegel: in progress of history a switch from one stance to an opposing stance. Hegel – proceeds from a particular conception of spirit.

[20] History: self-awakening of the spirit happens because it is dialectical (thesis, antithesis, synthesis). (Compare Simmel: life can only be defined with reference to death).

Every historical form exists at one time, strives for its opposite, 'because it cannot understand itself otherwise' (Hegel). All one-sidedness – lack of self-consciousness. 'The uniquely disconcerting thing about this theory is that it seems compelling.' (Wind). Karditz⁵ (to Hegel): 1) underlying of absolute spirit, 2) stages of history too clearly defined in relation to reality: polarity within each individual stage already (in Hegel seen from outside!).

16 December 1932

Dialectical system of history versus the polar conception. Hegel's presuppositions: 1) every history must have a subject. Every abstract history is bound to empirical presuppositions. For H. the subject of history can[not] be an empirical object. The subject can only be the whole: history = truth = whole. This whole for Hegel is the absolute spirit. Every empirical object is materially bound, absolute spirit without bounds. This spirit becomes self-conscious by passing through historical phases. History: self-education of absolute spirit. Purpose of history: spirit advancing to self-consciousness; development of history from lower to higher forms. Each successive form more sophisticated than its predecessor. Consummation in the self-awakening of the spirit. Endpoint: self-discovery of the spirit. Thus history is a form of theodicy.

[21] Why should self-consciousness articulate itself in time? Hegel's system does not ask this question. The spirit is actually suprahistorical; consideration of history from outside, likewise its objective. Development external. Contrast – conception that, instead of absolute spirit, posits a spirit existing in history. (Historical researchers are themselves subject to the conditions of history. History seen in this way – as with Hegel – is expansion, but this individual spirit is not the absolute spirit, of which we know nothing. The subjects of history are things that encounter this spirit through experience. Problem: how can material of history be understood by this being? Parallel problem to Hegel – absolute spirit – self-development. Expansion with both, but here no absolute, rather a finite being that seeks to absorb and understand foreign things. Term hermeneutics fundamental.⁶ (Interpretation of documents, gradual understanding, penetration of unknown documents). Originally applied in theology: discovery of the deeper grounds of doctrine (Greek: to find, to discover. *ἐρμενεύειν*).

Today: counterpart to source critique, exploration of meaning = hermeneutics (this self-understanding does not exist for Hegel, who is interested only in absolute spirit).

⁵ Perhaps critique (of Hegel)?

⁶ Or possibly foundation

No 'looking back' ('here essential') in Hegel either (purely progressive). The finite spirit looks back because that means attainment of clarity: interpretation of documents from earlier stages, simultaneous comprehension of self. Connected to the problem of the Renaissance. Hermeneutics can be expanded to an understanding of all symbols. Historical consciousness that interprets documents is [22] just temporal unfurling of what is interpreted as a symbol every day. Thus historical visualisation is the process of becoming self-conscious. Interpretation of symbol = renaissance of an original sense.

20 December 1932

Through recourse to earlier state – the intervening is negated, questioned, annihilated (in Renaissance and hermeneutics): questioning of tradition (compare textual history of paintings) problem of hermeneutics: in the field of jurisprudence. (Art history): Controversy over the meaning of the law with respect to the 'case' at issue. Interpretation of the law. Meaning of the law often nullified by application to the individual 'case'. Tradition and revolution, rebellion mutually dependent. Regress to be understood in terms of momentary need. (Hermeneutics). Question: to what extent is the interpreter's work objective? To what extent subjectively determined? Is it possible to grow above and beyond historical determination?

View of the sceptic: no original, only different versions (for example, in the interpretation of texts, to which all else relates). Each era constructs its own original text; there is no absolute judgement (as with the law). Thus historical development a series of illusions, abiding self-delusion of prior epoch uncovered by the next etc. This is the modern view in all the humanities. Dilthey: interpretation historically determined. Dichotomy between accuracy and vitality, between clarification and comprehension. For Dilthey: humanities: treatment with things with which we ourselves are [23] involved. The humanities are thus tied to history, historically determined. 'Vitality', which ought to outweigh the precision of the natural sciences. Problem of hermeneutics: means of interpretation to be justified objectively. (Dilthey – pathos). Dilthey draws on Schleiermacher here. Contrast: Schleiermacher's hermeneutics comes from theology. Polarity of own excitement at objective criticism known to him – unlike Dilthey (see below page). Aim of historical exegesis: find subject meaningful. Aim of theological exegesis: 'preach' subject (not mutually exclusive). Tradition and revolution complement each other on the path of Schleiermacher's theology.

(Schweitzer: messianic idea, end of the world). Result: original version must be ambiguous. That is, symbols must be capable of polarisation.

10 January 1933

Start with Ranke's thesis: task of history: reveal events as they really were. Thesis easily refuted since realisation of task impossible in real life. Phenomenon of the historical perspective of the interpreter ignored by Ranke's thesis. In looking back – grasping the whole – the historian does not create reality as it appeared to the consciousness of the individual in the present. (Paradox of Rankean postulate). (Perspectival distortion).

Compare Nietzsche: on the value and unvalue of history. Interest in the subject produces distortion.

[24] Ortega y Gasset – theory of vital reason. 'Task of Our Time' introduced by Ernst Robert Curtius. Theory of perspective (elaborated by Nietzsche, in Leibniz's monadology, in Ortega y Gasset) seen as specifically Spanish by Curtius! 'On Love', most recent work. Elaborated by Nietzsche: concept of the historical horizon and concept of plasticity. Concept of the horizon drawn from the world of spatial perception, likewise the concept of perspective. Horizon of historical apprehension indeterminate. Present in the form of knowledge, ability. Concept of plasticity and quality of elasticity that give the horizon of knowledge its mobility.

13 January 1933

Paradox of infinity (compare Russell): the part just as large as the whole (in history – equal magnitude of perspectives; the same relationship in mathematics). In infinite series in mathematics any part can be attributed to another, yet remains a part. Series of simple and square numbers: equally long. Thus for infinite magnitudes the part is not greater than the whole. Connected to this: problem of perspective. Leibniz: solved the phenomenon of perspective with number theory: monadology. Question as to connection between individually defined world pictures: recombination all in one universal world picture: question elucidated by number theory. harmony: every autonomous series in prescribed relationship to another autonomous series.

Each individual experience in temporal sequence [of] completely dissimilar experiences. This process can only be defined from within. Subject of experience, even law of all experiences, not [25] reducible to coefficient: monad. Monad = 1) living reflection of the universe. 2) Monads have no windows (apparent contradiction to 1)). Course of the phenomenon explicable from its own pictorial law. Thus individual – autonomous with respect to mirroring capacity. – Problem of understanding. We can [only] understand problems that we ourselves can do. Two flaws in this theory: 1) presupposition false, 2) things that we cannot do we can very well understand. (Simmel: reference to expression of the eyes).

17 January 1933

This theory (see above) lacks phenomenon of learning: everything comprehensible because I already know in advance. Counterpart to Leibniz monadology.

Presupposition: the external to be sharply distinguished from the internal. Problematic! The problem of the 'external' cannot be taken for granted. Antithesis of external and internal interpreted thus: everything that is foreign to me comes from outside, is spatial. Problem: projecting the external into the interior (temporally determined, that which I know).

Problem of distinction between animate and inanimate world pre-empts projection. Problematic because this first occurs at a highly developed stage of consciousness (see primitive consciousness: there is nothing neutral, everything seen in these terms: danger or not. Neutral position: developed stage of consciousness; reaction as of friend or foe.

[26] Problem of understanding inverted. Expression: the most elemental, neutral thing: the derivative (concept of the symbol ambiguous!) – 'breakthrough of horizon' utterly impossible for a Leibnizian monad. Act of understanding for Leibniz only ever a moment, process of understanding in temporal sense falls away, likewise the form of experience, which changes, in temporal development. But through memory: insight into one's own changing experience. Extent of variation already contained within one's own experience. – The experience of the interpreter – proceeding from a labile point. (Overlooked in both theories) From there back to the linear concept of time again. Critique! Concept of experience too static and selective!

Capacity for plasticity given with the notion of labile experience. Lack of lability (rigid character) renders action easily predictable. The mechanical thus appears as a borderline case of the organic, not vice versa. With the mechanical, lability transitions into constancy (theory of Peirce = natural calculability is experiential impasse!) Every productive act is a breakthrough through custom. – Lability of understanding should form the basis of historical interpretation. Transfer of this postulate to the realm of ethics.

Dilthey: understanding not possible if people from past epochs were essentially different. But: people of various epochs only differ by degrees. Historical understanding: degrees of emphasis to be understood differently (see analogy between [27] historians, actors).

20 January 1933

Historian–actor comparison to approach problem of lability. Solve paradox of perspective with assumption that static position constructed. Problem of lability in connection with concept of time. Labile behaviour does not exclude the possibility of lability being directed from a single centre (strong character). History that spares lability endangers character.

Historical historiography sees multiple alternatives. That which is regarded as the only scientific approach (primarily Max Weber). – Grading of decision, degree of obligation (in action), thus lability leads to recognition of this different level of obligation (against theory of appropriate rigidity of character, without lability, unambiguous action). But strengthening of character through differentiation. Lability is necessary correlate, intensity develops in this differentiation. The stronger the intensity, the better the historian. Counter-theory: he should have no character (Riegl: the best art historian has no taste, i.e., is without prejudice). So the organ destroys in enabling an approach to these things.

Idea of absolute lability versus absolute character. Between these two theories = middle ground to be found. Absolute lability corresponds to the theory that one can describe something that [28] is actually present: objectivistic theory. The other corresponds to the monadological theory – science. Conjectural adaptation in parallel with psychologically determined adaptation of the actor.

Schleiermacher: psychological and grammatical methods must complement each other.

The psychological method gives perspective its standpoint. This division into grammatical and psychological goes together with the concept of the symbol in affect and sign-character.

24 January 1933

Presentation of history opens up the problem of intuition. – The discovery of hermeneutics already contains both poles: psychological and philological = relation of hermeneutics (= psychology) and criticism (Schleiermacher). – One direction or tendency: history as rigorous science, psychology as unscientific, sequence seen as natural phenomenon, isolation of the purely grammatical: history as abstract philology.

Reaction to this form: Dilthey started out with the same presuppositions. Exact science exists in the natural sciences, but the subject and his experience cannot be eliminated from history. Consequence: striving purely towards the psychological tendency, which leads to history approximating art: poetic experience becomes the basis of historical knowledge (even if it comes from Hegel!) With that, history softens into psychologism. Consequence: diffusion, aestheticising view of history.

[29] The harshest critics of Dilthey (Westphal in particular) say that the belletristic conception of history would not have been possible without Dilthey's assertion that psychology is central to historical knowledge (form based on this, such as Emil Ludwig's, blamed on Dilthey).

Ideal of exact science to be considered in more detail (see aims of lecture course!) Certain conception of nature necessary for this idea. Now problem of nature – history seen from

the methodological side. – Einstein: ideal of rigorous science not remotely possible in physics. His conception of nature dependent on nature having ‘frayed fringes’. No precise definitions. ‘Fringes’ – fluid boundaries.

Poincaré: on probability calculations in physics: if we knew things exactly, we could never know exact results, for that knowledge would be infinite. Our knowledge of phenomena is not exact, therefore it is possible to predict average values. Individual cases cannot be precisely determined in advance. Hence ignorance fundamental.

One expects uncertainty – ‘frayed fringes’. The same development in modern psychology (Hering): overly precise observation destroys the vague phenomena one wants to see. – To account for the vibration of phenomena one contests the simple assumptions of classical physics. Take a stand against the grammatical conception and Dilthey’s conception.

Physicists and historians elaborate their theories.

[30] Question: how are these theories adapted to the subject? Forms of distancing: degree of distance already in the realm of the senses. In the same way to say of objects: we grade these objects in a certain way. The sciences can therefore be categorised by degrees of distance, measured according to the interest taken by the person.

As with psychology: initially no separation, the same: in science (for example astrological science, originally related directly to people (magical, astrological), now lacks any particular interest).

Question of distancing, isolation. The problem: the symbol (star sign for instance) has ambiguity, vibration. In the method of distance there develops what science calls isolation. Symbolic character destroyed; it reckons with signs alone.

The essence of natural science, therefore, is that it separates subjects, dissolves the emotional cadence of symbols and reckons with signs.

Clarity of terms achieved only by separation. In physics the phenomenon is ‘controlled’. Postulate of isolation replaces the postulate of exactitude.

27 January 1933

Isolating the subject from its environment also isolates the observer. This leads to the fungibility of observer and phenomenon.

[31] This antithesis (humanities – natural sciences) introduces the method of isolation into the theory of science, which actually wishes to exclude it. Complete isolation of the subject makes actual knowledge impossible. – Every science factors instruments into the study of

its objects, but the instruments themselves are not precisely known either. (This leads to a 'fraying' of nature).

There is access to the object in every science. Dilthey refuted: means of inquiry ought to belong to the subject matter. Difference between nature and history not found here. Nor is the antithesis between description and prediction all that radical (physicist episode). Historian: not only describes but also interprets. –

Dilthey ('Introduction to the Humanities') distinguishes two forms of experience: external and internal experience (internal = real experience), various degrees of distance. From there to the problem of historical evidence.

The historian experiences from within, makes no hypotheses. Internal experience is thus absolutely evident. External experience is questionable, is hypothesis.

Dilthey's methodology actually already elaborated and applied by Husserl (phenomenology). Evidence in Husserl obtained by 'bracketing the external world'. Hypotheses disappear. What remains: 'pure description of essence'. Description yields essentials. This unlocks a region where a new a priori opens up.

[32] Within the visual there are identifiable strata about which evidential statements can be made. Danger of this method: this method finds that there are ideas not bound to expressions of will (decisions). Gradation of idea to expression of will through pure description. But decision of will in fact without idea (see beginning of lecture course). (Distance!) Dissociation from object, abstraction brought into this method as accessory! This should first be clarified by science.

31 January 1933

Husserl: eidetic method. Concept of eidos is central. The type discovered here is fungible (characteristic of Husserl's conception of eidos). Both object and observation are fungible. Ideal of exactness even finds its way into phenomenology ('Philosophy as Rigorous Science'). Evidence ('absolute certainty of the demonstration') finds its way into description of inner experience. Thus only a minimum of experience.

Fungibility greatest in mathematics and physics. But no historian will lay claim to fungibility. Historical criticism is always explication. The proof occurs in history, not in the form of deduction – due to the irreplaceability of the individual. Thus no absolute evidence. Within history: degrees of understanding. Gradation of evidence, that is, levels of understanding to be accepted as phenomenon.

[33] From here the postulate of Dilthey and Husserl to be relinquished: evidence of internal experience scant, mathematically abstract, so not at all effective for historical

science. There is no certainty in history. Objects ambiguous and irreplaceable. From doubtful evidence to the question: what are historical facts? – Important in modern philosophy of history: (Jaspers etc.).

3 February 1933

Concept of the situation (which actually contains no more than concept of the horizon and plasticity, compare Nietzsche). Central question: what makes an object an historical phenomenon? Rickert: the object becomes an historical phenomenon when we ask what value a certain fact has for the subsequent development or for the observer etc. The isolated historical fact is therefore individual, irreplaceable; defined by the question of what it means for scientific development. Individualisation thus arises in relation to a specific value. Explore whether this value relation really creates the postulated individualisation. But it is actually linearising. Developmental series constructed.

Question: is the objective possible without this series formation?

Instead: what does the historical fact mean for the individual? Fact related to historical figure. The fact assumes the character of the document. For Rickert, the subject of history will always be a general concept.

[34] The alternative method also asks about the subject of history, but the subject in opposition to the object. This inevitably leads to the concept of the historical figure, for whom the fact means something.

Concept of historical figure already fraught with all the tensions existing within the whole epoch.

Contra Rickert: theory of interpretation of documents to be related to concrete anthropology. Only then can the concept of the 'historical document' be explained. Various tensions to be reduced to the status of an individual: thus possibility of 'understanding'. Problem of understanding lies – quite primitively – in the transfer from one horizon to another.

Attitude toward surrounding symbols fundamental. The historian on similar (only extended) levels and stages of understanding in relation to the object – like everyone else in relation to facts in normal life (compare Wilamowitz: intimate approach to historical objects). But forms of distance and engagement always remain the same.

Normal understanding lacks the pretention to scientific certainty (unlike historical understanding). Theories (historical) become verifiable. Logic of history not reducible to relations of value, phenomenon of engagement to be brought in also! –

[35]

7 February 1933

Double problem: each historical phenomenon points back, each historical fact exists only for the specific researcher. Problem of historicism.

(Max Weber: 'division of powers' in the historical sciences).

(Compare *Justi* – distinction between the early and the mature El Greco). – (See Nietzsche!) – Result: historical research entails personal engagement.

Typological conception of history first occurs in the apologetics of early Christianity. Christian doctrine of salvation announced from a specific point in history. From there order of backwards and forwards. – Visual imagination of Christian Church determined by typological attribution. Historical perspective likewise. From there a view of history in three phases: 1) anticipated, gradual, 2) real and 3) consequences of the Annunciation. Corresponding allegorical interpretation of documents (compare Plato's allegorical interpretation; in Philo for example) – by way of comparison (representing the same mental attitude): the Kantian conception: history of philosophy regarded much as a Christian apologist regards religion. (Plato vindicated in view of Kant, compare Natorp). The whole of history thus articulated in highpoints and setbacks. Relationship between the two similar to that between Christian apologists. (Importance of the heretic not to be underestimated in this development!) Exactly the same in philosophy. (Aristotle's position, for example: means to higher development of which they themselves are not aware). Scale of heights thus drawn from a certain 'salvific truth'. 'Redemption' [36] of Kant attributable to allegorical interpretation. –

History of philosophy as 'history of problems'. Regularity in sequence of philosophemes – with retrospective effect on individuals in whom they found expression (compare again Plato – Aristotle). Clarity of direction derived from immanent logic. Individual degraded to means of development.

Idea of a history of problems in philosophy: Windelband. In art history: Wölfflin ('art history without names'). Individual as mere bearer, neutral, imaginary point of intersection for problems. Tension between orders eliminated for the individual as soon as the individual becomes paradigm for an order (according to the history of problems). Indifference of the individual, replaceability (not only history without names – also without individuals). Just as the tensions are neutralised for the individual, so too for the historical epoch. Pure morphology of correspondences justifies romantic mystical history⁷ (Schelling – Hegel – Kant).

⁷ Or conception of history

M. Weber: scientific observation must itself be value-free. Distinction between valorising and value-related science, between constitutive and regulative (:Kant distinction!). Scientific work thus purely technical description of attributes.

Article: Logos! (art bypassed by art history – Friedländer's phrase). The same thing is⁸ political history: history of political technique, manipulation. Actual political impetus eliminated. – Typological view of history – have taken this position myself, but with the ability to modify it.

[37] This results in shift of perspectives and concomitant emergence of peculiarities that would not otherwise be so clear. Comparison of these transformations with those in the natural sciences (Einstein). But in the natural sciences: these transformations purely mathematical by equivalence, perspective interchangeable.

14 February 1933

Transformation in history gives rise to psychological difficulties. Bound up with various degrees of obligation and insight: this in distinction to mathematical transformation. – With respect to the typologically established: postulate = dispersal. With respect to the apologetic conception: 'pause for reflection' for historians (compare symbol theory), that is, also taking position of adversary as binding to a certain extent. Problem: changing position within certain latitude – issue of tolerance. This is the proper logical problem in the philosophy of history. Necessary lability thus created.

History of problems: figurative⁹ obligation lifted, widest indifference.

Typological history: conception of time clearly fixed; history as history of problems: concept of time – postulate: keeping present at arm's length, that is, maintaining indifference.

Equal validity of phenomena posited – compare Rothacker, 'Introduction to the Humanities'. Correspondence = intuition in ethics, aesthetics etc. Here everything brought to the level of logical [38] disobligation, no relation to decision-making subject. – This is factually and logically untenable, demonstrate by example (compare also paradox in Hume – knowledge – politics) –

Weber: the unpleasant consequences of this decision. Gulf between life and science.

⁸ Or in?

⁹ Or figural?

17 February 1933

Historians caught in action–contemplation polarity (see Weber).

Dogmatic consolidation in typological conception: pause for reflection absent. Unequivocal decision. This dogmatic certainty springs from the same sources as the certainty of the primitives. Consolidation of action must be loosened. Step of mediation necessary for distanciation to introduce pause for reflection. – W. – Loosening derived from position on action–contemplation. For varying degree of obligation. Loosening may lead to an element of scepticism. On the idea of a history of problems, then: central: concept of solution and concept of problem. In fact, both hang in the air (compare Riegl – problem as such). Solutions give rise to ever new problems and vice versa: that in the process of history things proceed of *t h e i r o w n a c c o r d*. Refer phenomena from the history of problems back to individuals. Here: to the inverse expectation as with regard to the typological conception: postulate: consolidation. Scepticism of historicism bound to absolute ideal of knowledge. [39] Inherent contradiction. The measure by which this is to be determined can only come from the world itself. The circle must be acknowledged! One's own stance only emerges when one takes it. Expectation that one will make decisions under stress and thereby change the situation of which one is oneself a part.

Pause for reflection: analysis only present when action no longer instinctive. American pathos. Afterthoughts not aprioristic but arise out of tense situations (adversaries!). Limitation: only tension of a kind that allows one to remain in the situation.

21 February 1933

Concept of the symbol – occurring under specific natural conditions (impetus, action, natural process, compare Köhler: animals). How is 'concept of cultural crisis' to be defined? (collapse of symbolic world). Crisis of Christian world order, for example heresy.

- 1) Crisis categorised as heresy in typological conception. Crisis levelled as heresy.
- 2) History of problems perspective does not acknowledge the concept of crisis (disintegration phenomena regarded as logical absurdity) because the concept of the historical figure is absent. Subject of the crisis: actually this individual.
- 3) Weber's perspective: value relations neutralised; properly speaking: permanent crisis. –

[40] Significance of crisis only tied to concept of crisis by recourse to subject, to concept of emergence. – Parallelism in view of nature: concept of death eliminated. (Analogy in view of history: elimination of concept of crisis). –

Nineteenth century: dissociation, isolation of artist from all cultural life. Parallel development in science: narrow specialisation. Development of isolated technicians (in art:

extreme refinement, compare Verlaine) without connection to the outside world. Rootlessness. Organs formerly used to engage with the environment symbolically are broken, that is, the world as a whole falls apart. If functions (art = science) become isolated, the whole falls apart (Impressionism, reaction). (Ortega y Gasset!) Crisis begins even at the point of perfection. Expressionism mere effect, not crisis itself. Opposing point: recourse, pause for reflection, reduced, only life in action: will to cultural mortification. These two tendencies meet: in the security of culture. Instinctive security (Thiersch) sought as ideal (Klages, 'The Intellect as Enemy of the Soul'). – In contrast to these two: process of engagement within the symbol: concept of crisis: understood as enduring phenomenon. Highlight: cultural pathology. Theory of money. Tension: inflation (as major crisis).

24 February 1933

Money as instrument, as signal for events. Two approaches: 1) Coin regarded as specific material, purely materially, [41] as product (metallistic theory: significance of money depends on material). Coinage eventually achieves major significance (compare deterioration). Potential for circulation becomes criterion of identical value. Hence this metallistic theory – interrupted on deterioration. 2) Purely abstract, conventional sign as criterion. First in Hume: money regarded as value of goods: superstition = quantity of money no criterion for wealth of a country. Knapp, 'Theory of Money'. Value of coin decreases in line with quantity. Expression of efficiency, to be designated: sign theory – regulated by conventional attribution of signs (Hume nevertheless saw the limits of this theory). Observation: increasing quantity of money produces more work. Production increased. Hume explains this by illusion: similarities erroneously taken for identity: productive illusion. No break in transition. Imagination defines reality of external world. This also holds for money. For Hume: wisdom of the state consists in working with this illusion. Neither pure material nor pure sign (first and second theories) will suffice. Money: both simultaneously. Not object but symbol effecting action. –

'Reflection' – through knowledge of deflation and inflation. Pathology of money instructive! (deflation and inflation). First – not barter but specific sacrificial cult, the miraculous (compare proportions of silver and gold: sun–moon calculation (see Wagemann, 'What is Money?')).

[42] Thus not commercially determined. –

Polarity of deflation (mathematical theory) and inflation () transferable to other phenomena. –

28 February 1933

Same polarity that applies to instruments also applies to existence of man, and thus to the philosophical problem of freedom.

Together with concept of absolute freedom – absolute determination of man. (Kant's critical philosophy – unification, dual orientation). –

Pause for reflection associated with multiplicity of alternatives. Meaning of action: it must have consequences. Problem of freedom: number of possible alternatives to be determined. Degrees of freedom to be distinguished. Range of possibility cannot be created a priori, measure of obligation gradable. Absolute will to action always extremely rare.

Awareness of dubitability to be acknowledged as cultural fact. – – Relation of man to objectively traditional systems (compare Simmel). Disintegration. Simmel: means subjugate men. Culture produces forms that confine them. Tragedy of modern culture: tendency towards disintegration of culture as such. Simmel – essay: 'The Crisis of Modern Culture'. (Simmel himself standing in the midst of disintegration!) Isolation from other areas has led to concepts entirely deprived of symbolism. Conciliation of natural and cultural philosophy.